



Oxford Policy Management

# HSNP M&E Component

Key findings from the evaluation

30 April 2014

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- Methodology
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# Hunger Safety Net Programme Pilot

- HSNP pilot was an unconditional cash transfer programme that aimed to reduce poverty, food insecurity and malnutrition, and promote asset retention and accumulation
- Operated under Ministry of State for the Development of Northern Kenya and Other Arid Lands with financial support from DFID
- Pilot phase looked to test 3 targeting mechanisms
  - Community-based targeting
  - Dependency ratio
  - Social Pension
- Phase II currently underway

# Evaluation methodology



# Evaluation methodology


- Mixed methods approach
- Experimental design based on cluster randomised controlled trial
- Three rounds of quantitative and qualitative research
  - Baseline (2009 – 2010)
  - Follow-up 1 (2010 – 2011)
  - Follow-up 2 (2012 – 2012)
- Covered 48 sub-locations across the four programme counties: Mandera, Marsabit, Turkana and Wajir

# Evaluation methodology

- Comparative assessment of targeting by targeting method
- Assessment of programme operations
- Routine operational monitoring
- Estimate of programme impact
  - Comparison of treatment and control (dif-in-dif)
  - Heterogeneity analysis
  - Results representative of all HSNP households in treatment and control areas covered by the evaluation

# Measuring impact

- The impact analysis is based on a **difference-in-difference** approach
  - A range of impact indicators are compared at baseline and follow-up for treatment and control households
  - The measure of impact is the dif-in-dif estimate, which is calculated as the difference between follow-up and baseline for treatment households minus the corresponding difference for control households



# Measuring impact

- There are differences in the degree to which different types of households have been affected by the programme
- We attempt to understand this using impact **heterogeneity analysis**
  - Consumption expenditure
    - ✦ *is impact stronger for poorer households?*
  - Households size
    - ✦ *since the transfer value is not indexed to household size, is the programme impact stronger for smaller households?*
  - Total cumulative value of transfers received per capita
    - ✦ *some HSNP households have received fewer transfers than others, so is programme impact lower for households that have received very few transfers (adjusting for household size)?*
- We also estimate impact using models that control for various household, individual, and community-level covariates as a robustness check

# Impact areas

- Primary impacts
  - Poverty/consumption
  - Food security
  - Assets
- Secondary impacts
  - Health
  - Education
  - Livelihoods
  - Saving, borrowing, credit
  - Vulnerability to shocks
  - Empowerment of women
  - Well-being of children and old persons
- Unintended impacts
  - Dependency (labour participation)
  - Prices
  - Informal transfers
  - Social tensions
  - Mobility patterns

# Context



# Context

- Severe drought in 2011
- Insecurity
- Remote
- Dependence on pastoralism
- High prevalence of extreme poverty
- Severe food insecurity
  
- Small (but not insignificant) value of transfer (at baseline 12% total consumption; 23% food consumption)
  
- Flat rate – not indexed to household size
  
- Inflation has affected value of transfer; HSNP responded by raising value

## Different levels of exposure to the programme


- Some HSNP households, particularly SP households, contain multiple beneficiaries

Indicator	CBT areas	DR areas	SP areas	All HSNP areas
Proportion of HSNP households containing more than one beneficiary	3.9	2.6	13.4	5.1
Mean number of beneficiaries per household	1.04	1.03	1.13	1.05

- Some HSNP households have received more payments cycles than others
  - This can be due to lags between targeting and start of payments across different sub-locations; as well as individual households experiencing delays in enrolment, missing payments, or having problems accessing payments
- Value of the transfer per household member is smaller for larger households


# Different levels of exposure to the programme

- 73% have received more than 11 transfers, with another 25% receiving from eight to 10 transfers



# Different levels of exposure to the programme

- Transfer has nominal *per capita* value of between KES 350 and KES 700 for just over two-thirds of beneficiary households



# Characteristics of beneficiaries

- c.90% of beneficiaries named as primary recipient
- c.55% beneficiaries are heads of their household
- c.75% beneficiaries female
- Mean age 50 (panel sample)
- Person who decides how the cash transfer is spent is changing over time
  - heads of household and main providers wresting control of the transfer

Person who decides how the transfer is spent is...	Follow-up 1	Follow-up 2
Beneficiary	81	73*
Neither primary nor secondary recipient	10	15**
Household head	61	72**
Main provider	47	62**
Female	69	59*

## How the transfer is spent

- Not changing over time

<b>Proportion of beneficiary households reporting spending the transfer on (%):</b>	<b>First transfer</b>	<b>Most recent transfer at FU1</b>	<b>Most recent transfer at FU2</b>
Food	88	88	85
Debt Repayment	40	40	45
Clothing	23	25	31
Health	21	22	17
Education	18	21	24
Livestock	11	12	7

- These are very poor households using the transfer for immediate needs

# Primary intended impacts




# Consumption and poverty

- Mean monthly consumption expenditure per adult equivalent
- Poverty rates
  - proportion of households that fall within the poorest 10% of Kenyan households (i.e. bottom national decile)
  - depth of poverty (how far a household lies, on average, below this poverty line)
  - severity of poverty (aggregate measure that gives more weight to households far below the poverty line)

# Consumption and poverty

- After one year no significant impact but trends pointed towards HSNP fulfilling its function as a safety net
- Was the programme able to consolidate its effects to have a positive impact on household consumption and poverty after two years?

Household poverty rates at baseline and follow-up 2 by treatment status



# Consumption and poverty

- These results are statistically significant on the dif-in-dif measure
  - Per adult equivalent monthly consumption increased by KES 247
  - HSNP beneficiaries 10% less likely to be poor than controls
  - Difference in P1 and P2 of 7% each
- These results driven by fall in consumption and increase in poverty rates for controls, rather than increase in consumption for beneficiaries
- In other words, HSNP does act as safety net

# Food security

- 87% of HSNP households report that since receiving the cash transfers they have been able to have more and/or larger meals
  - This has grown over time (increase of 16 percentage points from follow-up 1)
- Per adult equivalent monthly food consumption increased by KES 213
  - driven by fall among control households rather than improvements for HSNP beneficiaries – again illustrating the safety net function of the programme
- At follow-up one we found a significant positive impact on dietary diversity. However, at follow-up 2 this impact disappeared. This is odd but may be explained by:
  - control households reinvigorating their diets after a particularly harsh year in 2011
  - increased availability of diverse food stuffs in local markets
  - control households consuming a smaller volume of food but equally diverse diets as HSNP households.
- We do find a positive impact on dietary diversity for poorer households at follow-up 2

# Food security

- These findings need to be put into context.
- Situation in northern Kenya and the evaluation areas is one of high levels of food insecurity.
- The quantitative data show that even though there has been some improvement between baseline and follow-up, a high portion of households remain very vulnerable and adopt coping strategies that in particular relate to poor food security.
- These include borrowing food, selling livestock to buy food, reducing the number and size of meals consumed, and going whole days without eating.
- These findings imply that, despite the many interventions providing food or cash support in northern Kenya, the problem of pervasive food insecurity persists

# Food security

- Given this context, it is important that HSNP does not destabilise food aid.
- The frequency and severity of food shortages and the low purchasing power of HSNP transfers mean that regular cash transfers and food aid should be seen as complementary, not as substitutes for each other.
- To test for the possibility of a substitution effect between cash and food for treated households we measure the proportion of households receiving food aid, school feeding and supplementary feeding
- The results show that HSNP households have not been deprioritised for food aid and other support such as school and supplementary feeding programmes.
- This result is ambiguous
  - Positive in so far as households in desperate need of food support are not being deprioritised as a result of receiving the HSNP.
  - On the other hand, unless the value and coverage of the transfer is significantly increased, it is unlikely that HSNP on its own will be enough to effectively alleviate food insecurity in these areas.

# Assets

- Cash transfers may allow beneficiaries to hold onto livestock and other assets that otherwise they might have been forced to sell in times of distress.
- Cash transfers may even allow households to invest in accumulating more assets over time as a potential pathway out of poverty.
- Livestock
  - HSNP seems to have an impact on livestock ownership, driven by the increased likelihood of HSNP households to own goats and sheep.
  - But the results are not fully conclusive
    - ✦ Positive impacts do not persist once other factors are controlled for, nor for any specific categories of households under the heterogeneity analysis
    - ✦ Controlling for other factors reveals a significant (but small) negative impact on camel ownership
      - This could be influenced by households' reluctance to accurately report livestock holdings (particularly camels, which are especially associated with wealth)

# Assets

- There is lots of testament from the qualitative research which shows that the aggregate measure of impact provided by the quantitative data obscures a diversity of experiences.

*“I had some goats and whenever I was faced by a problem that requires a financial solution, I had to sell a goat. However, I have not sold a single goat since this programme started.”* [Beneficiary, Wajir]

*“We have reduced the number of animals we sell.”* [Beneficiary, Marsabit]

*“When I have a problem I sell one of my goats and take care of that problem, and when I receive money next time I replace that goat that I sold and life goes on.”* [Beneficiary, Turkana]

- HSNP seems to be allowing some households to avoid distress sales of livestock

# Assets

- Other assets
  - HSNP is not having a significant impact on ownership of a range of key productive assets, or on the value of assets owned
  - Qualitative research again reveals some diversity with some beneficiaries reporting using the transfer to purchase consumer goods (non-productive assets), such as housing materials, clothing, or basic household items
- Lack of impact on both productive and non-productive assets, including livestock, not surprising given the value of the transfer and the predominant uses to which the transfer is put (e.g. food and basic needs)

# Secondary and unintended impacts



# Education

- No impact on education enrolment or attendance rates, or on education expenditure by households
  - Baseline revealed that cost and access are not the key barriers to schooling in the HSNP districts
  - Most common reasons given for having never attended school were domestic duties (49%), working for household's own production (13%), and parental attitudes (15%)
  - Qualitative research also revealed barriers to education beyond the ability of the programme to transcend, such as security and education supply-side constraints
- If, rather than cost, it is cultural attitudes and the need for children to help with domestic and productive work that form the main barriers to education it is not surprising that we find no impact on education expenditure.

# Education

- However, for those children already in school, the HSNP does have positive impact on school performance
  - Significant impact on mean highest grade achieved for children aged 6-17
  - Children in HSNP households more likely to pass grade Standard IV (after controlling for household and community factors)
- Results driven by poorer households and households for whom the cumulative *per capita* value of the transfer is larger
- Qualitative research shows that this result is primarily related to the positive impact of the HSNP on children's psychosocial wellbeing
  - by enabling children to arrive at school better fed, better presented, and adequately equipped with uniform and school supplies, the HSNP is improving children's confidence and capacity to concentrate, which in turn seems to be positively impacting school performance

# Other areas of impact

- Health
  - Small but significant impact on health expenditure
  - No impact on health status (not surprising given complexity of factors determining health outcomes)
- Economy and livelihoods
  - Not causing inflation or contributing to food price stabilisation (coverage and value too small)
  - Not creating dependency (labour participation)
    - ✦ Broader economic, social and political changes, have disrupted pastoralist livelihoods and led to increasing reliance on other sources of income, such as casual labour and selling bush products
  - Much qualitative testimony as to positive impact of HSNP on local markets and livelihoods
    - ✦ Traders respond to increase in demand from influx of cash
    - ✦ Some beneficiaries starting or improving small businesses (e.g. petty trade)
    - ✦ Non-beneficiaries benefitting from the provision of goods and services to beneficiaries

## Other areas of impact

- Households in rural northern Kenya have little access to formal financial institutions like banks, because their incomes are low and volatile, and because they lack assets for collateral when trying to seek loans.
- Saving money is therefore challenging, and local people tend to borrow from shops, relatives and neighbours or other informal lenders.
- HSNP improves households' ability to save cash, as well as access loans and credit
- It also enables them to reduce outstanding debt
- HSNP provides partial protection against shocks, by enabling some households to avoid certain types of negative coping strategy (e.g. selling livestock and rationing food)

## Other areas of impact

- Social dimensions
  - Appears to benefit women's economic and social empowerment by enabling some women to take more control of the household budget and to undertake income-generating activities
    - ✦ Makes issue of who controls the transfer in beneficiary households crucial
    - ✦ Qualitative testimony that HSNP sometimes creates tensions within households, especially between female recipients and their husbands
    - ✦ This might be interpreted as women being empowered to claim more equality with their husbands, but such an interpretation is not clear cut
  - HSNP may have some kind of impact on informal safety nets: 25% of beneficiary households report sharing some of their transfers
    - ✦ Though qualitative research shows that sharing and reciprocity arrangements are more strongly determined by social and cultural factors
  - No evidence that HSNP is source of tension within or between communities

# Implications for the HSNP



## Concluding remarks – Impact

- **HSNP is fulfilling its title and acting as a vital safety net**
- Different households respond differently to the transfer – greater impact on smaller and poorer households
  - Argument to target at the poor and may be index to household size
- HSNP does not have an impact across all domains
  - Need to be realistic about where such interventions can make a difference
  - In some areas, complementary interventions may be needed in order to enable the cash transfer to make a tangible impact
  - In others, conditionalities *might* be appropriate
  - In yet others, different interventions altogether may be required that focus more on the supply side
- Findings suggest that while HSNP may not be transformative, supporting basic consumption is essential

# HSNP operations assessment



# Methodology for operations assessment

- The operations assessment looks at various aspects of programme operations:
  - Targeting process and performance
  - Beneficiary and nominated recipient dynamics
  - Payments system
  - Rights under the programme
- Analyses two broad dimensions
  - Beneficiary and non-beneficiary awareness and perceptions about the programme
  - Functional effectiveness of the programme
- Draws on both quantitative and qualitative data (though sample differs slightly at each round)

# HSNP targeting process

- The HSNP piloted three different targeting mechanisms
  - Community-Based Targeting (CBT),
  - Dependency Ratio (DR), and
  - Social Pension (SP).
- Most recipients were aware of the targeting process in their area
  - However, there is reason to believe that mobile populations may have been partially excluded from the targeting
  - Mobile pastoralists require sufficient time to return to the sub-location in order to participate in targeting and registration processes
- Most recipients felt that the process was fair
  - CBT considered the fairest targeting mechanism by both beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries

# HSNP targeting process

- CBT slightly better at reaching the poor than SP or DR

	CBT areas	SP areas	DR areas
Proportion of households falling below 51% relative poverty line			
Beneficiary households (%)	51**	58**	63
Non-beneficiary households (%)	34	51	54
Ratio of poverty rates: beneficiaries vs. non-beneficiaries	1.50	1.15	1.16
CGH index: % of beneficiaries that are poor/poverty rate	1.21	1.08	1.05

# HSNP targeting process

- However, CBT performance in this regard not especially strong
  - 48 country study found a median targeting programme had a CGH index of 1.25, implying a transfer of 25% more resources to poor individuals than a universal programme
- In addition, there are a number of concerns around CBT when used in isolation
  - First, sub-location quotas did not generally reflect variations in poverty across sub-locations.
  - Second, households and communities suggested the need for more advance warning in order to attend the targeting meetings and to ensure that all households and villages are fully covered by the targeting process (CBT was worst performing in this regard)
  - Finally, there was a high level of inconsistency between districts in the types of households selected under CBT.
    - ✦ In Turkana there was evidence to suggest that poorer households were less likely to be selected, which would be consistent with concerns around capture of the targeting process by local elites

# HSNP targeting process

- Simulations show combining CBT with PMT could be much more efficient

	CBT areas	SP areas	DR areas	PMT
Proportion of households falling below 51% relative poverty line				
Beneficiary households (%)	51**	58**	63	75***
Non-beneficiary households (%)	34	51	54	26
Ratio of poverty rates: beneficiaries vs. non-beneficiaries	1.50	1.15	1.16	2.91
CGH index: % of beneficiaries that are poor/poverty rate	1.21	1.08	1.05	1.47

- PMT not perfect (significant inclusion and exclusion errors and difficult to implement)
- But combining PMT with CBT provides possibility to retain advantages of CBT in terms of having better information about the needs and poverty status of community members, and the advantages of PMT in terms of screening out wealthy households and avoiding exclusion of some groups or capture by elites

# HSNP beneficiaries and recipients

- CBT and DR target the household. The beneficiary is the member of the household who is nominated by the household.
- The SP targets individuals. The beneficiary is the individual who is directly eligible for the programme because of their age.
- Beneficiaries nominate two 'recipients' who are eligible to collect the transfer using the smartcard.
  - Enables beneficiaries who are unable to collect the transfer, or who lack national ID cards, to nominate a recipient to collect the money on their behalf
  - Provides a means by which agents can correctly identify those who are eligible to collect money on a beneficiary's behalf
  - Ensures the HSNP is integrated with the national ID card system, even in areas where levels of national ID card ownership are relatively low
- The primary recipient must be a national ID card holder and the name and photo of the primary recipient are stored on the smartcard. The secondary recipient does not need to be a national ID card holder.

# HSNP beneficiaries and recipients

- The large majority of beneficiaries were also primary recipients (c.90%)
- Indicates that beneficiaries are generally not delegating the task of collecting the transfer to others, which reduces likelihood that beneficiaries incur transaction costs in accessing payments
  - When the beneficiary is the secondary recipient, 9% report having problems with the primary recipient regarding collection of the transfer at follow-up 2
- Only a tiny portion of beneficiaries are neither primary or secondary recipients
- The profile of secondary recipients has changed over time.
  - The proportion of secondary recipients who are household members rose from 50% at baseline to 70% at follow-up 2 (households learning how to manage this system)

# HSNP payments system

- 99% of beneficiaries have correct knowledge of the payment amount
- But beneficiaries' knowledge about other aspects of the payments system has changed over time
  - 86% of beneficiaries had correct knowledge of the payment cycle at baseline, which increased to 97% at follow-up 2
  - Proportion of beneficiaries who know they can go to any paypoint to collect payment increased from 50% at baseline to 86% at follow-up 2
  - Proportion of beneficiaries who were told to go to only one paypoint to collect remained significant at follow-up 2 at 41%
- Liquidity remained a significant issue throughout the pilot
  - At follow-up 2, 9% had to visit the paypoint more than once to collect their last transfer
  - Over half of these report that the pay agent either did not have enough change or would only give out small amounts of cash at each visit

# HSNP payments system

- Only a very small portion of beneficiaries claim to know that they can save money on their card (6% at follow-up 2)
- Knowledge of the smartcard's saving function is not the only condition required for saving using the smartcard. Other reasons could include:
  - transaction costs involved in using the smartcard (for instance transport costs, time, and any payments made to third parties)
  - control non-beneficiary recipients may be able to exercise over the beneficiaries' savings through the smartcard
- Programme representatives are an important source of correct information about the payments system
- However, paypoint agents are increasingly the main source of information for beneficiaries (6% at baseline, 42% at follow-up 2).

# HSNP payments system

- Barriers to accessing payments
  - Travel to and from paypoints
    - ✦ Average travel time is 139 minutes
    - ✦ 5-7% of beneficiaries have to travel more than four hours to a paypoint
    - ✦ similar portion had to spend the night away when collecting the transfers
    - ✦ Distance to paypoints was cited as a concern by beneficiaries

*“The place where we are paid from is too far away in another centre. The elderly here struggle a lot to reach there ... and we feel bad about it. This distance is killing the old.”* [FGD with casual labourers, Turkana]

- Queuing at paypoints another cost, though queuing times have improved
  - ✦ average time beneficiaries had to queue for their last payment decreased from 144 and 137 at baseline and follow-up 1 to 98 minutes at follow-up 2

# HSNP payments system

- Repeat visits to paypoints represent another cost to beneficiaries.
- Reasons for repeat visits have changed over time
  - ✦ Paypoint machine or smartcard failures reduced from 77% at follow-up 1 to 37% at follow-up 2
  - ✦ Over half of all cases for repeat visits at follow-up 2 were because the paypoint agent either did not have enough change or would only release the payment in small amounts
  - ✦ This indicates that at least some paypoint agents have to manage the rate at which they disburse transfers in order to manage liquidity constraints
- The problem of liquidity faced by pay agents helps explain why 20-25% of beneficiaries can only collect their payments on one specific day.
- This restriction increasingly perceived as onerous for beneficiaries:
  - ✦ 9% report it as problematic at follow-up 1, 17% at follow-up 2

# HSNP payments system

- In addition to costs involved in travelling to the paypoint, the HSNP can pose costs to beneficiaries by presenting opportunities for individuals other than the beneficiary to receive cash from the transaction.
- These surplus charges represent additional costs to the beneficiary, reducing the value of the transfer ultimately received by the beneficiary.
- Although the portion of beneficiaries experiencing such costs is low, there are some important evolutions over time in terms of the types of costs incurred.
- Driver seems to be need of pay agents to manage liquidity constraints

## HSNP payments system

Proportion of beneficiaries (%):	Baseline: Sep 2009 – Oct 2010		Follow-up 1: Nov 2010 – Nov 2011		Follow-up 2: Feb – Nov 2012	
	Estimate	N	Estimate	N	Estimate	N
Reporting that they were charged fee by the paypoint agent when collecting payment	2	766	2	1,381	8	1,166
Reporting that they were ever made to buy something / charged extra for something in the agent's shop	6	767	6	1,381	2	1,166
Reporting that they were charged a fee by the person collecting the last payment (of those not collecting)	4	221	4	1,381	4	1,166
Reporting that they had to pay someone else in their community (i.e. not the person collecting the transfer) from their payment	0	767	3	1,381	0	1,166

- Though more pay agents charged a fee at follow-up 2, fewer made beneficiaries buy something from their shop or charged extra for goods purchased (in lieu of distributing the full transfer value).

# HSNP payments system

- Proportion of beneficiaries who never received a smartcard negligible, as is the proportion that report never having received any payments.
- Loss of card also not a common occurrence
- However, technical problems at the paypoint do remain a significant problem
  - Given often high opportunity cost for beneficiaries in accessing their payments, minimising instances of technical fault represents an important means of reducing the burden of the payments system on beneficiaries

# HSNP payments system

- Security not an issue

Proportion of beneficiaries (%):	Baseline: Sep 2009 – Oct 2010		Follow-up 1: Nov 2010 – Nov 2011		Follow-up 2: Feb – Nov 2012	
	Estimate	N	Estimate	N	Estimate	N
Who feel safe collecting payments and taking them home	86	764	96	1,381	96	1166
Reporting physical assault on way back home after collecting payment	1	680	1	1,381	0	1166

- It should be noted that sub-locations that were deemed insecure at the time of sampling were excluded from the evaluation sample frame. Therefore it is likely that the sampling strategy produced an upward bias in the proportion of beneficiaries who felt safe. If the full set of sub-locations where HSNP was implemented were included, this measure could fall.

# HSNP rights committees

- HSNP Rights component provides mechanism for individuals to express grievances and raise issues about any aspect of the programme's operation
- Most rights committees understood their role and several claimed to have been able to solve problems for beneficiaries.
- However, there were several cases where Rights Committee members did not understand their role, did not know how to address complaints or issues raised, or were unable to get adequate responses from the HSNP
- Three main problems were identified with regards to the capacity of rights committees:
  - Rights committee members did not always know what they are supposed to do (guidance on how to spend the money, or avenue of formal complaint)
  - Rights committee members were considered inactive (where rights committee members were known they were sometimes considered to not be a useful way to get information or raise issues with the programme)
  - rights committees did not always receive a response or get an appropriate reaction from the programme

# HSNP rights committees

- Even where rights committees have capacity, beneficiaries' awareness of their rights and the existence and role of the rights committee was low
  - at follow-up 2, just over a quarter of beneficiaries know who to talk to if they have a problem with the programme
  - of these, only 16% of these would follow the correct procedure by contacting a member of the rights committee
- In fact, at follow-up 2 the point of contact beneficiaries would most turn to if they had an issue with the programme was the paypoint agent (59%) or the pay agency (Equity Bank, 12%).
- the proportion of beneficiaries stating that they would talk to a paypoint agent about their problems has increased alongside the proportion of beneficiaries who claim to have first been informed about the programme by a paypoint agent
- This reflects a general trend in terms of the growing role of paypoint agents as primary contact points in the HSNP
- This sometimes results in the programme being identified with the pay agency rather than the Government of Kenya and its supporting partners

# Conclusions from the operational assessment

- Most respondents in HSNP targeted areas were aware of the programme and felt that the targeting process was fair
- However, need to ensure mobile pastoralists are not excluded
- Programme would be better served in its objectives by targeting using combination of CBT and PMT
  
- Beneficiaries' awareness of most programme details has improved since 2009, such that nearly all beneficiaries are now aware of the core programme details.
- However, there are significant gaps in beneficiaries' knowledge of other important elements, including which paypoints may be visited and when, and the ability to use smartcards as a savings tool

# Conclusions from the operational assessment

- The payment system has performed generally well. Very few beneficiaries have never received a smartcard or never received any payments from the HSNP
- However, distance to paypoints remains a concern for some beneficiaries, and large queues impose an additional burden
- A significant minority of beneficiaries have to visit a paypoint more than once to collect a full payment, or are constrained in when they can visit
- Technical faults with the payment system are often cited, but the main reason relates to liquidity constraints faced by paypoint agents
- Pay agents represent the primary contact point with the HSNP for beneficiaries
  
- Rights committees face number of significant challenges
- Only around a quarter of beneficiaries claim to know who to talk to if they have a problem or issue to raise with the programme

# Evaluation reports

Go to [www.opml.co.uk](http://www.opml.co.uk) and search 'HSNP'



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Thank you

# Additional slides – evaluation methodology

- Evaluation methodology
  - ‘Perfect mimicry’:
    - ✦ targeting undertaken in all evaluation sub-locations which were then matched into pairs
    - ✦ 48 programme sub-locations randomly selected from all programme sub-locations
    - ✦ Each evaluation pair then randomly assigned between treatment and control by public lottery (*bahati na sibu*)
    - ✦ Control households incorporated into the programme after 2 years upon completion of the final round of the evaluation survey

## Additional slides – sample

Round	Beneficiary status	Treatment areas	Control areas	Overall
<b>Baseline</b>	Selected for HSNP	1,571	1,536	3,107
	Not selected	968	1,033	2,001
	Overall	2,539	2,569	5,108
<b>Follow-up 1</b>	Selected for HSNP	1,434	1,433	2,867
	Not selected	881	889	1,770
	Overall	2,315	2,322	4,637
<b>Follow-up 2</b>	Selected for HSNP	1,224	1,212	2,436
	Overall	1,224	1,212	2,436

## Additional slides – sample

- Sample attrition
  - attrition at follow-up 2 is largely driven by Mandera and Wajir and by fully mobile households (who are more prevalent in these counties).
  - Since these households have particular characteristics we adjust the survey weights used for the analysis
- Final impact analysis is therefore based on the comparison of 1,224 treatment group households with 1,212 control group households
- Use of sampling weights means results are representative of all HSNP households in treatment areas covered by the evaluation and the corresponding control households in the control areas.

## Additional slides – evaluation methodology

- Because the targeting process was perfectly mimicked in treatment and control areas we are able to measure the **Average Treatment Effect**
  - ATT measures the effect of the transfer on households *actually selected* by the programme
  - This is opposed to the **Intended treatment Effect**, which would measure the effect of a transfer only on those households the programme *intended* to treat
    - ✦ Most other similar studies available in the literature generally compare eligible households in treatment and control areas, rather than *actual* beneficiaries with *would-be* beneficiaries, and thus rely on ITT measure of impact
    - ✦ To the best of our knowledge, this is the first completed study in the region that provides a fully robust measure of the ATT directly originating from the randomization process

## Additional slides – measuring impact

- Robustness checks are made to account for various factors that may affect the estimates for each impact indicator
  - **Randomisation worked**, ensuring almost no significant differences between treatment and control groups at baseline
  - Exogenous factors - time varying community-level factors which could have affected treatment and control areas to differing extents
    - ✦ supply of food aid and other aid programmes including emergency support;
    - ✦ road access;
    - ✦ severity of the drought;
    - ✦ supply of education and health facilities...
  - Checks on exogenous factors show that on average **there have not been significant differences** in the degree to which treatment and control areas have been affected by exogenous factors

## Additional slides – child nutrition

- Child nutrition is dependent on a variety of exogenous factors such as public health and sanitation conditions and cultural feeding practices.
- However, by improving food consumption and dietary diversity it is possible that HSNP could have an impact on child nutrition.
- Evaluation finds no impact on stunting, wasting or proportion of children underweight. This unsurprising given the variety of exogenous factors that affect nutrition, which a cash transfer by itself is unlikely to influence.
- We have some reservations about the quality of the anthropometry data; although they do corroborate results of other studies conducted in these areas
- Child nutrition is also an area where time-varying external factors (e.g. severity of drought, supply of food aid, etc.) may have been experienced to different extents by HSNP and control areas. However, the sample size is relatively small here, so the heterogeneity analysis does not show up conclusive patterns.

## Additional slides – methodology for operations assessment

- Operations assessment draws on data collected during all three rounds of the evaluation study
- However, sample is not identical at each round
  - At baseline, because the impact evaluation survey was carried out prior to any payments in evaluation areas, the baseline data reported here are drawn from a set of sub-locations adjacent to evaluation sub-locations where the programme was operating at baseline
  - This means that operational monitoring data collected at the baseline are taken from sub-locations that were not randomly selected or assigned to treatment, and therefore are not directly comparable with the data from follow-up 1 and follow-up 2
  - In addition, the sample at follow-up 2 is drawn from a reduced subset of the sub-locations surveyed at follow-up 1. Where possible in this report estimates for follow-up 1 are drawn from the same set of sub-locations as those surveyed at follow-up 2 in order to render the estimates comparable.
- Quantitative data is supported by qualitative research was conducted comprising key informant interviews, focus group discussions and qualitative panel studies with stakeholders including sub-location chiefs, HSNP rights committees members, beneficiaries, non-beneficiaries, paypoint agents, and members of local relief committees

## Additional slides – HSNP rights committees

- HSNP Rights component provides mechanism for individuals to express grievances and raise issues about any aspect of the programme's operation
- Complaints about cash transfer programmes can be rare because beneficiaries do not see them as entitlements, but as gifts that can be withdrawn
- Non-beneficiaries do not have this direct conflict of incentives, but may worry that complaining could mean that they are excluded from future programmes
- Rights committees were bodies set up in communities to deal with any complaints about the functioning of the programme.
- Representatives were elected to rights committees by the community.
- Rights committees were expected to report all issues raised to the HSNP and communicate the responses back to the people raising them.
- The rights committees were supposed to resolve complaints without support from the HSNP Secretariat where possible.